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We examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of investment analysts in response to their prior 
performance relative to their peers within a continuous time/multi-period framework. Our model 
predicts a U-shaped relationship between the boldness of an analyst's forecast, that is, the deviation 
of her forecast from the consensus and her prior relative performance. In other words, analysts who 
significantly out perform or under perform their peers issue bolder forecasts than intermediate 
performers. We then test these predictions of our model on observed analyst forecast data. 
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we document an approximately U-shaped relationship 
between analysts' prior relative performance and the deviation of their forecasts from the consensus. 
Our theory examines the impact of both explicit incentives in the form of compensation structures 
and implicit incentives in the form of career concerns, on the dynamic forecasting behavior of 
analysts. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, our results imply that analysts who face 
greater employment risk (that is, the risk of being fired for poor performance) have greater 
incentives to herd, that is, issue forecasts that deviate less from the consensus. Our multi-period 
model allows us to examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of analysts in contrast with the extant 
two-period models that are static in nature. Moreover, the model also differs significantly from 
existing theoretical models in that it does not rely on any specific assumptions regarding the 
existence of asymmetric information and/or differential analyst abilities. 
 
 





We examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of investment analysts in response to their prior 
performance relative to their peers within a continuous time/multi-period framework. Our model 
predicts a U-shaped relationship between the boldness of an analyst's forecast, that is, the deviation 
of her forecast from the consensus, and her prior relative performance. In other words, analysts who 
significantly out-perform or under-perform their peers issue bolder forecasts than intermediate 
performers. We then test these predictions of our model on observed analyst forecast data. 
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we document an approximately U-shaped relationship 
between deviation of analysts’ forecasts from the consensus and their prior relative performance.  
  Our model relies on two assumptions: an analyst's compensation is convex in her 
performance relative to her peers and faces significant negative career concerns, that is, the risk of 
losing her job for poor relative performance.  These assumptions are consistent with existing 
empirical and anecdotal evidence.  Although data on analysts’ compensation is not available, Wise 
(2000) notes that there are large pay discrepancies between analysts being named to Institutional 
Investor’s All-America research team and those that do not make the team.  Given that Leone and 
Wu (2002) find that Institutional Investor all-stars have superior performance to non-star analysts, this would 
imply convexity in the compensation structures for analysts.  Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) find 
that an analyst is more likely to be fired if her forecast accuracy declines relative to her peers.  
However, they find no association between an analyst’s probability of turnover and absolute 
forecast error.  In other words, this suggests that it is relative, rather than absolute performance, that 
matters.   
  The model we propose and investigate can be briefly described as follows. At each 
forecasting date, an analyst faces the choice between a bold strategy and a conservative strategy.  
The analyst's forecast deviates to a greater extent from the consensus forecast under the bold 
strategy than the conservative strategy. The bold and conservative strategies may result from private 
signals received by the analyst or from publicly available information about the firm being covered. 
Under either strategy, the analyst has a nonzero probability of either outperforming or under 
performing the median analyst. The analyst is compensated at the end of each forecasting period 
and her compensation is a convex function of her prior relative performance over some time 
horizon. There is a nonzero probability that the analyst may be fired if her relative performance is 
below an exogenous level. The analyst has inter-temporal preferences for the periodic cash flows 
that comprise her compensation and dynamically chooses the bold or conservative strategy at each 
date to maximize her expected utility. We assume that the analyst has linear preferences purely for 
simplicity.  Our analysis can easily be generalized to incorporate risk aversion. 
  We explicitly solve the analyst's stochastic dynamic optimization problem and show that the 
optimal policy for the analyst can be described as follows: there exist two thresholds of prior 
relative performance such that if the analyst either outperforms the higher threshold or under 
performs the lower threshold, she chooses the bold strategy and if her prior relative performance 
lies between the thresholds, she chooses the conservative strategy. Therefore, the analyst makes a 
bold forecast if she either significantly out-performs or under-performs the median analyst and 
makes a conservative forecast if she is an intermediate performer. 
  The intuition for these results is the following. When the analyst significantly outperforms 
the median analyst, the convexity of her compensation structure induces her to take on the increased 
risk of issuing a bold forecast. On the other hand, if she significantly under performs the median, 
she faces a substantial risk of being fired for poor relative performance. Therefore, she takes on the 
increased risk of the bold strategy to increase the probability that her performance will rise above  
the level where she may be fired. At intermediate levels of prior relative performance, the analyst 
trades off the higher expected compensation from choosing the bold strategy for the lower 
probability that her performance may decline below the level where she may be fired from choosing 
the conservative strategy. In general, there exists a nonempty intermediate region of prior relative 
performance where she prefers the conservative strategy. 
  We also show that if the analyst faces little or no risk of being fired, she will always choose 
the bold strategy. This result follows easily from the convexity of her compensation structure. Our 
results have immediate implications for herding by analysts. In particular, they show that 
intermediate performers tend to deviate less from the consensus, that is, herd more than significant 
out-performers and under-performers. Moreover, our result that an analyst always chooses the bold 
strategy if she faces little or no employment risk indicates that the incentive to herd increases with 
employment risk. In particular, this implies that more experienced analysts who face lower 
employment risk herd less than less experienced analysts. This prediction is consistent with the 
empirical results of Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) who examine a sample of stock analysts' 
earnings forecasts and show that younger analysts tend to herd more than older, more experienced 
analysts who face lower employment risk.
1  
Our results therefore highlight the impact of both explicit incentives in the form of 
compensation structures and implicit incentives in the form of career concerns on the forecasting 
behavior of investment analysts. Several recent papers have emphasized the importance of career 
concerns in various contexts.  Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast and Stole (1996) and 
Morris (1997) argue that career concerns may induce corporate and/or fund managers to ignore 
private information and follow the herd or avoid following it when their actions are observable. In 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990), "smart" managers receive correlated information, while "dumb" 
                                                 
1 Chevalier and Ellison (1999) obtain similar results in their empirical investigation of mutual fund managers.  
managers receive uncorrelated noise. Thus, a manager who learns that his private information 
differs from that of another manager believes that he is more likely to be "dumb", ignores his 
information and "herds".
2  In Prendergast and Stole (1996), managers have private information 
about the precision of their information. A bolder action signals that a young manager knows his 
information to be good, and hence young managers have an incentive to take excessively bold 
actions. Older managers have an incentive to become jaded and do not change their actions a great 
deal from period to period. Zwiebel (1995) proposes a model of the behavior of corporate managers 
where taking an unobserved unconventional action increases the variance of the market's ex post 
assessment of a manager's ability. In a result that is reminiscent of the results that we obtain, 
Zwiebel (1995) shows that average managers prefer the conventional action because it reduces the 
risk of their being fired, while high or low ability managers may prefer unconventional actions. 
  Our paper differs significantly from the above papers in that we focus on investigating the 
dynamic forecasting behavior of analysts in a multi-period/continuous time framework, rather than 
the two-period models examined in the above papers.  Welch (2000), in particular, notes that these 
existing static theories are “designed to explain a steady state in which all analysts herd perfectly, 
not to explain an ever varying time-series of recommendations or a residual difference in opinions 
across analysts.” (pg. 370).   Our dynamic model attempts to address some of these concerns.  
Moreover, in contrast with the above papers, we do not make any specific assumptions about 
whether analysts possess different abilities and whether they receive private signals.  Therefore, our 
results do not rely on the existence of asymmetric information and/or differential abilities, but 
depend only the convexity of compensation in relative performance and the existence of significant 
career concerns.   
                                                 
2 Graham (1999) considers a model patterned after Scharfstein and Stein (1990) to investigate the herding behavior of 
investment newsletters.  Trueman (1994) also proposes a model that demonstrates herding by analysts.  
  Using data from the IBES history tapes on individual analysts’ forecasts between 1988 and 
2000, we test the predictions of our model.  Specifically, each quarter we rank analysts into deciles 
based on past forecasting performance calculated over varying time horizons that range from 1 year 
to 3 years.  For each analyst, we calculate boldness as the normalized deviation from the consensus 
as in Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000).   We then compute median future boldness for each decile 
of past relative performance.  Consistent with our predictions, we find evidence of a U-shaped 
relation between future boldness and past performance.  It is possible that this U-shaped relation is a 
result of analysts persisting in choosing bold or conservative strategies and not due to dynamic 
alteration of strategies by analysts.  In other words, an analyst who is always bold is more likely to 
take on extreme positions in relative performance.  We control for this possibility in our empirical 
tests, and find that the U-shaped pattern still holds.  As an alternative methodology, we test for the 
U-shaped relation using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression methodology.  These tests lead to 
qualitatively similar conclusions. 
Our empirical results contribute to the existing literature in that we investigate the 
forecasting behavior of all analysts in response to their prior performance and document, for the 
first time, a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between the boldness of an analyst's forecast and 
her prior relative performance. Hilary and Menzly (2002) also empirically investigate the 
relationship between boldness and past performance. Consistent with our findings, they report that 
analysts who have performed well in the past tend to issue bolder forecasts. However, they do not 
document that analysts who have performed poorly in the past also issue bolder forecasts. They 
propose a behavioral model based on overconfidence to explain their findings. Our model offers a 
rational explanation for bold forecasting behavior by out-performers and under-performers. Hong et 
al (2002) empirically examine the effect of career concerns on boldness and find that more  
experienced analysts are more likely to deviate from the consensus.  From an empirical standpoint, 
we complement their findings by examining and documenting the effect of prior performance on 
analysts’ incentives to deviate from the consensus.
3   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow.  In Section 2 we present the model. In 
Section 3, we state our main results regarding the optimal forecasting behavior of analysts. In 
Section 4, we present the results of empirical tests of our predictions. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. All detailed proofs are relegated to the Appendix.  
 
2. The  Model 
 
 
The primary focus of this paper is the dynamic forecasting behavior of an analyst in response to 
his prior performance relative to his peers. We consider an infinite horizon, multi-period 
framework. The set of forecasting dates is characterized by the set 
{} ,... 3 , 2 , , 0 , , 2 , 3 ....., ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ≡ Γ . The set of forecasting dates is a doubly infinite set to 
emphasize the point that there is no “initial date” in our framework. The fundamental economic 
variable we model is the cumulative forecasting performance, that is, the sum of the forecasting 
errors, for an analyst over a time horizon T . T  is the exogenously specified horizon over which the 
analyst’s performance is evaluated. The actual value of T  does not play an important role in our 
analysis and it may also differ across analysts.
4 If  ) (t e  denotes the cumulative forecasting error of 
an analyst at date  Γ ∈ t , and  ) (t em  denotes the median cumulative forecasting error for all analysts 
over the same time horizon t, then 
(1)   ) ( ) ( ) ( t e t e t q m − =  
                                                 
3 Hu et al. (2003) find a similar U-shaped relation between relative risk choices of mutual fund managers in response to 
their prior relative performance. 
4 Empirically, we allow T vary between one and three years.  This does not qualitatively alter the results.  
denotes the relative forecasting performance of the analyst at date t.  (.) q  is a stochastic process 
with support in  ) , ( ∞ −∞ .    The median forecasting error is used as a benchmark purely for 
concreteness. Our theoretical results do not depend on the specific benchmark used. At any date t, 
we assume that an analyst has the choice between adopting a bold strategy or a conservative 
strategy. If he adopts the bold (conservative) strategy, then the change in his relative forecasting 
performance over the next period ∆  is a normally distributed random variable with mean µ  and 
standard deviation  ) ( 2 1 σ σ  with  2 1 σ σ > . Therefore, 
(2)  
N t q t q
N t q t q
2
1
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
σ µ
σ µ
+ ∆ = − ∆ +
+ ∆ = − ∆ +
 
under the bold and conservative strategies 1 and 2 respectively. In the above, N  is a standard 
normal random variable.
5  
  It is important to emphasize here that the bold and conservative strategies may represent 
either private or publicly observable signals. In other words, our theoretical framework does not 
rely on any specific assumptions regarding the observability of the analysts’ signals on the basis of 
which they make their forecasts. Therefore, asymmetric information is not a crucial ingredient of 
our model although our model is certainly consistent with it. Further, we do not make any specific 
assumptions regarding the abilities of analysts, that is, they may all possess the same ability or have 
different abilities. The fact that neither asymmetric information nor differential analyst abilities 
plays a crucial role in our theoretical analysis makes it significantly different from earlier theoretical 
frameworks that have been applied to examine analyst behavior.
6  In all these frameworks, 
asymmetric information and/or differential analyst abilities play important roles.  In summary, the 
nature of the information that analysts possess and the analysts’ forecasting abilities do not affect 
                                                 
5 Since the analyst can only choose either the bold or the conservative strategy at any date, we use the same notation for 
the standard normal random variable without loss of generality. 
6 See, for example, Scharfstein and Stein (1991), Zwiebel (1995), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Graham (1999)  
our model as well as our theoretical results. Ours is a simple rational model of forecasting strategy 
choices by analysts. 
There is an exogenously specified level of relative performance  b q  such that if  (.) q  exceeds 
b q , the analyst is fired with some probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ∆ α .
7 We also assume that the analyst bears 
significant personal costs from being fired. These proportional costs are described by the parameter 
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ , that is, the analyst loses a proportion δ  of her expected future compensation is he is fired. 
  The analyst is assumed to be risk-neutral and his compensation is assumed to be convex in 
his relative performance. The risk-neutrality of the analyst is assumed purely for simplicity of 
exposition and does not affect our results qualitatively. For analytical tractability, we assume that 
the compensation of the analyst at date t is given by 
(3)   ))] ( exp( [ ) ( t cq g t C − ∆ =  where  0 , 0 > > c g . 
For subsequent notational simplicity, we normalize g  to 1. From (3), we note that as the analyst’s 
performance varies from being very good to very bad,  ) (t q  varies from being significantly negative 
to becoming significantly positive. The goal of the risk-neutral analyst is to choose his forecasting 
policy ξ  representing his choice between a bold and conservative strategy at every forecasting date, 
in order to maximize his discounted expected compensation. At any date t, his optimal future 
forecasting policy should therefore solve 
(4) 
))] ( (exp( )) ( ( ) 1 [( sup
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7 The assumption that the analyst is not fired with certainty is consistent with the empirical findings of Hong, Kubik, 
and Solomon (2000).   They find that the probability of an analyst getting fired increases with underperformance , but it 
is significantly different from one.  
In the above,  b τ  denotes the random date at which the analyst is fired. Notice that the 
analyst’s payoff when he is fired is a proportional of his optimal value function  )) ( ( b q v τ  that is his 
maximum expected future compensation. We have incorporated the fact that the analyst’s optimal 
policies are clearly stationary, that is, his decision at any date depends only on his relative 
performance at that date. The subscripts on  ξ ξ C q ,  denote the dependence of the analyst’s relative 
performance and compensation on the forecasting policy he chooses. β  is the analyst’s constant 
discount rate for future cash flows. We can use standard dynamic programming techniques to obtain 
the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the analyst’s optimal value function: 
 











In the above,  ) (∆
i q  represents the analyst’s relative performance at the end of the next period if he 
follows strategy i and his relative performance at the beginning of the period is q. The first term in 
the expectation is the optimal value function at the end of the period, the second term is the 
analyst’s compensation for the period, and the third term represents the proportional personal costs 
he pays if he is fired due to his relative performance being above the threshold level  b q .  The 
subscript  1 = fired  represents the event that the analyst is fired. Incorporating the exogenous 
probability  ∆ α  that the analyst is fired when his relative performance is above the threshold, we 
obtain 
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The Continuous Time Framework 
  For analytical tractability, we now make the standard continuous time approximation that is 
valid when the time period between successive dates ∆  is small relative to the time period over 
which the analyst’s forecasting behavior is being investigated. In this case, equation (2) for the 
evolution of the analyst’s relative performance is replaced by 
(5) ) ( ) ( t dB dt t dq i σ µ + =  under strategy  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i  where  (.) B  is a Brownian motion. 
The analyst’s objective in (4) is replaced by 
(6) 
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For subsequent analytical and notational convenience, we re-define the analyst’s optimization 
problem in terms of the process  )) ( exp( ) ( t q t p − = . Using Ito’s lemma, the evolution of the process 
(.) p  under strategy  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i  is given by 
(7)  )] ( )
2
)[( ( ) (
2
t dB dt t p t dp i
i σ µ
σ
+ − =  
and the analyst’s objective is to choose his forecasting policy to maximize 
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where  (.) u  is the analyst’s optimal value function as a function of 
q e p
− = . Notice now that low 
(high) values of  (.) p  represent good (bad) relative performances by the analyst. In order to ensure 
that the analyst’s value function is defined, we assume that  i µ β > , 2 , 1 = i . 
If  (.) u  is the optimal value function of the dynamic optimization problem (8), then, as 
mentioned earlier, the analyst’s optimal policy is stationary, that is, his choice of strategy at any  
date is not explicitly dependent on time and depends only on the current measure of his relative 
performance  p . We denote the analyst’s optimal value function by  ) (p u . We may use traditional 
dynamic programming arguments analogous to those used in deriving the discrete-time Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation to write down the following formal Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for 
u: 
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2
1
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i i  . In the dynamic programming framework, the variable  p  above represents 
the value of the state variable  (.) P  so that the term 
c p  is the instantaneous rate of compensation of 
the analyst.  
  Hence, in regions where strategy i is optimal, the value function  ) (p u  must satisfy the 
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i i η η ,  and 
− +
i i ρ ρ ,  are the positive and negative roots respectively of the quadratic equations:  
(10) 
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In order to ensure that the analyst’s value function exists, we assume that her discount rate  i µ β >  
and is high enough so that 
(11)  
+ + < < i i c c ρ η ,.    
The following lemma collects properties of the roots 
− + − +
i i i i ρ ρ η η , , ,  that will be used frequently. 
Lemma 1 
a) 
+ + + + + + + + < < < < 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 , , , ρ η ρ η ρ ρ η η  
Proof.  In the Appendix. 
We now state (without proof) the following well-known verification theorem for the 
analyst’s optimal value function. 
Proposition 1:  Suppose u is a function that is differentiable on  ) , 0 ( ∞  and twice differentiable on 




) ) ( ( 1 ) ( 1 [ sup 0
2 2
2 , 1 pp i p i
c
p p p p i u p pu p u u
b b σ µ αδ β β + + + + − + − = ≤ > =  
and  ∞ < ∞ →
c
p p p u / ) ( lim (no bubbles condition). Then u is the analyst’s optimal value function. 
Proof. See Karatzas and Shreve [1998]. 
This completes the formulation of the model and the mathematical preliminaries. 
 
3.  The Analyst’s Optimal Forecasting Policy 
In this section, we explicitly derive the optimal forecasting policies for the analyst for all 
possible pairs of bold and conservative strategies 1 and 2 characterized by the volatility parameters  
) , ( 2 1 σ σ  with  2 1 σ σ >  and his discount rate β  is high enough to ensure that condition (11) is 
satisfied. We show that there exist two levels  h l p p ,  with  h l p p ≤ of prior relative performance as 
measured by the process  (.) p  such that it is optimal for the analyst to choose the conservative 
strategy when his prior performance lies between the thresholds and switch to the bold strategy 
above the threshold  h p  and below the threshold  l p .  Therefore, the analyst chooses the bold 
strategy when he is either a significant out performer or under performer and the conservative 
strategy when he is an intermediate performer.  We may have  h l p p =  in which case the analyst 
always chooses the bold strategy and the switching of strategies is sub-optimal. We provide a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the switching of strategies to be optimal for the analyst. 
The intuition underlying these results is the following. If the analyst is a significant out 
performer, the risk of his getting fired is very low. Therefore, he chooses the bold strategy since it 
increases his expected compensation. On the other hand, if the analyst significantly under performs 
the threshold  b p  where he may be fired, he faces significant risk of being fired. He therefore, 
chooses the bold strategy to maximize the probability that his performance may increase above the 
level below  b p . At intermediate levels of performance, the analyst trades off the higher expected 
compensation from choosing the bold strategy for the lower employment risk from choosing the 
conservative strategy. In general, there exists an intermediate region of relative performance where 
the analyst prefers the conservative strategy. We now proceed to formalize this intuition. 
Consider the class of policies defined by the trigger r  with  r pb ≤ where the analyst always 
chooses strategy 1 for  r p p p b ≥ ≤ ,  and strategy 2 for r p pb < < . It can be shown that the value 
function  r u  of such a policy has the following functional form:  
(12) 
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where the coefficients are determined by continuity and differentiability conditions at the points 
r pb,  and their dependence on the trigger r  is explicitly indicated. Define the differential operators 
2 , 1 ; ,
' = i L L i i  as follows: 
  pp i p i i pp i p i i u p pu u u L u p pu u u L
2 2 ' 2 2
2
1
) (       ;
2
1
σ µ αδ β σ µ β + + + − = + + − =   
The following propositions completely characterize the optimal policies for the analyst. 
Proposition 2:  Suppose  
(13)  0 | ) ( 2 > + + = b b p p
c
p p u L  
There exist a threshold level of relative performance  b p p > *  such that if 
a) * , p p p p b ≥ ≤ , it is optimal for the analyst to choose the bold strategy 1 and if 
b) * p p pb < < , it is optimal for the analyst to choose the conservative strategy 2. 
Proof.  In the Appendix. 
Condition (13) of the proposition is therefore a sufficient condition for the analyst to choose the 
conservative strategy 2 in some region of prior relative performance. Intuitively, the condition 
expresses the fact that the employment risk of the analyst and the difference between the risks of the 
bold and conservative strategies are high enough to ensure that it is optimal for the analyst to choose  
the conservative strategy when his prior performance is “close” to the threshold  b p . The following 
proposition shows that condition (13) is also necessary for the optimality of switching to the 
conservative strategy in some region of prior performance.  
Proposition 3. Suppose 
(14) 0 | ) ( 2 ≤ + + = b b p p
c
p p u L  
Then the optimal policy for the analyst is to always choose the bold strategy. 
Proof.  In the Appendix. 
  If condition (14) is satisfied, the employment risk of the analyst and/or the difference in the 
risks of the two strategies is low enough that it is sub-optimal for the analyst to deviate from the 
bold strategy. 
  The results of the above propositions imply that it is either always optimal for the analyst to 
choose strategy 1 or there exists a non-empty intermediate region  ] , [
* p pb  of prior performance 
where the analyst optimally chooses strategy 2.  If the analyst chooses strategy 2, he deviates less 
from the median analyst than if he chooses strategy 1.  Suppose now that strategy 1 represents a 
private noisy signal for the analyst and strategy 2 represents the herding strategy. In this setting, our 
results imply that when the analyst is a significant out performer or under performer, he trusts his 
private signal whereas if he is an intermediate performer, he chooses to herd. We would like to 
emphasize again that our model does not make any specific assumptions about whether the analyst 
receives private signals. Hence, our result that significant out performers and under performers 
deviate more significantly in their forecasts from the median than intermediate performers does not 
depend on whether there is asymmetric information and/or the analysts possess different forecasting 
abilities.  Our model and results depend on two main assumptions:  an analyst’s compensation is 
convex in her relative performance and faces significant career concerns.  
 
4. Empirical  Results 
Data Description: 
In order to test the above propositions on past forecast accuracy and boldness, we collect forecasts 
from the IBES Detailed History database over the period 1988 to 2000.  The Detailed History 
database tracks the identity of the analyst issuing the forecast, her employer, the date of the forecast, 
and the actual value of her forecast.  This dataset also allows us to identify and track each analyst 
across time, even if they switch investment.   
In order to construct our measures of forecast accuracy and forecast boldness, we use the 
ranking methodology introduced in Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000).  The procedure is as 
follows.  We use the I/B/E/S data to construct a quarterly performance measure based on an 
analyst’s forecast accuracy.  We define Fi,j,t as the most recent earning-per-share forecast of 
quarterly earnings issued by analyst i on stock j in quarter t.  Our measure of analyst i’s accuracy for 
firm j in year t is the absolute difference between her forecast and the realized earnings-per-share of 
the firm, Aj,t:  
t j t j i A F error forecast , , , − =   
We then sort the analysts who cover a firm in a quarter based on their forecast errors given above. 
We then assign a ranking based on this sorting:  the best analyst receives a rank of one, the second 
best analyst receives a rank of two, and so on.  In the case of ties, we assign each analyst the 
midpoint value of the ranks that they take up.  Since the maximum rank an analyst can receive for a 
firm depends on the number of analysts who cover the firm, we scale an analyst’s rank by the 


























score accuracy ,  
where number of analystsj,t is the number of analysts who cover the firm in a given quarter.
8  We 
then calculate the average score for each analyst over the previous four, eight, and 12 quarters.  
Higher overall scores correspond to better analyst performance.   
We use a similar procedure to construct a measure of an analyst’s forecast boldness.  Let 
∑ − ∈
− =
i m t j m t j i F
n
F , , , ,
1
, where –i is the set of all analysts other than analyst i who produce an 
earnings estimate for stock j in year t, and n is the number of analysts in –i. Hence,  t j i F , , −  is a 
measure of the consensus forecast made by all other analysts except analyst i following stock j in 
quarter t. 
t j i t j i t j i F F boldness , , , , , , − − =  
We then replicate the previous ranking methodology for constructing the analyst accuracy score as 
in the previous subsection. 
 
Empirical Findings 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample of analysts’ forecasts.  Our sample contains a 
large number of analysts from a number of different investment firms.  The average number of 
unique investment firms each quarter is 366.37, while the average number of unique analysts 
issuing forecasts each quarter is 1,763.67.  The average analyst in our sample issues quarterly 
earnings-per-share estimates for 7.32 stocks.
9  The average stock in a sample has 5.56 different 
analysts providing coverage.  Note that we require at least two analysts to be covering the stock in 
order to calculate our boldness and performance rankings.   The average analyst in our sample has 
                                                 
8 For example, the lowest rated analyst for each firm would receive a score of zero, while the highest rated analyst 
would receive a score of 100. 
9 The maximum number of stocks covered by an analyst is 94.  This could be attributed to team of analysts rather than 
an individual.  
4.46 years of experience.  Finally, average analyst boldness and average analyst accuracy average 
50.38 and 50.46.  By construction, the median values of both of these variables is 50.00. 
  Table 2 examines whether analysts actively move between conservative and bold  
forecasting strategies.  The table shows a transition matrix relating average past boldness to future 
boldness.  The table is constructed as follows.  For each quarter in our sample, we calculate the 
average boldness score for each analyst over the previous four quarters and then divide analysts into 
deciles based on this score.  We similarly rank analyst into boldness deciles based on their current 
boldness score.  The results suggest that analysts actively move between bold and conservative 
strategies.  For example, of the analysts ranked into the lowest past boldness decile, only 15.93% 
pursue the least bold strategy in the subsequent period.  Similarly, of the analyst ranked into the 
highest boldness decile based on past performance, only 18.02% fall into the same decile in the 
subsequent period.   It’s worth noting that the p-value from a χ
2 test indicates that we can reject the 
null hypothesis of equal proportions within each past boldness decile. 
  Table 3 presents our results on the relation between past performance and future boldness.   
Each quarter, we rank analysts into deciles based on their average past performance.  The average 
past performance of each analyst is calculated using accuracy scores over the previous four, eight, 
and twelve quarters.  We then compute mean future boldness for each of these deciles.  In order to 
test for a U-shaped relation, we computer the average difference in boldness between past 
performance deciles 5 and 6 and then test to see whether mean boldness in each decile is different 
from this value.  Panel A presents our findings for the case where past performance is calculated 
over the previous four quarters.  The results confirm the existence of a U-shaped relation.  The 
worst past performance decile has future boldness of 51.06, which is statistically significant.  
Similarly the best past performance decile has future boldness of 50.61, which is statistically  
significant.  The results in Panel B and Panel C show that the results are not affected by the choice 
of the time horizon over which past forecast accuracy is calculate.  Similar results obtain if we 
calculate average past performance using the previous eight quarters or the previous twelve 
quarters. 
  In Table 4, we control for the past boldness of the analyst.  It is possible that the U-shaped 
relation documented in Table 3 is a result of analysts persisting in choosing bold or conservative 
strategies and not due to dynamic alteration of strategies by analysts.  In other words, an analyst 
who is always bold is more likely to take on extreme positions in relative performance.  The results 
presented in Table 4 panel are still consistent with a U-shaped relation between past performance 
and future boldness even after controlling for past boldness.  In contrast to the results presented in 
Table 3, we find that the relation tends to be driven by the best past performance decile and the 
worst past performance decile.  Panels B and C show that the choice of time horizon over which 
past forecast accuracy is calculated produces similar results.   
 
 Fama-MacBeth Regressions: 
Our findings above are consistent with a U-shaped relation between boldness and past performance.   
In this section, we use Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions to examine the robustness of our results.  
For every quarter in our sample period, we estimate a cross-sectional regression relating future 
boldness to past accuracy.  Given the results in Table 4, we include in the regression model 
indicator variables if the analyst’s past performance is either in the top performance decile or the 
bottom performance decile.  Based on the existing literature, we also control for an analyst’s 
experience and the number of firms covered by the analyst.  High experience is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the analyst has more than four years of prior experience and zero  
otherwise.  Number of firms covered is the number of firms the analyst covers in a given quarter.  
We also control for the average boldness of the analyst over the previous four quarters. 
In Table 5, we report the average coefficients from these regressions along with the 
associated p-value from a simple t-test for the statistical significance of the estimates.  In 
specification (1), we find that analysts in the worst past performance decile and analysts in the best 
performance decile have significantly higher boldness than other analysts.  Specification (2) shows 
that this result holds even after controlling for experience, past boldness, and the number of firms 
covered by the analyst.  Interestingly, the coefficient on number of firms covered is negative and 
significant, indicating that analysts covering more stocks tend to issue more conservative forecasts.  
The final specification examines the interaction between past performance and experience and 
boldness.  The results indicate that experienced analysts are more likely to deviate from the 
consensus following poor performance.  However, experienced analysts with good past 
performance are not more likely to issuer bolder forecasts. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We examine the dynamic forecasting behavior of investment analysts in response to their 
prior performance relative to their peers within a continuous time/multi-period framework.  The 
model differs significantly from existing theoretical models in its dynamic nature and the fact that it 
does not rely on any specific assumptions regarding the existence of asymmetric information and/or 
differential analyst abilities.  The central prediction of the model is that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between the boldness of an analyst's forecast, that is, the deviation of her forecast from 
the consensus and her prior relative performance. In other words, analysts who significantly out 
perform or under perform their peers issue bolder forecasts than intermediate performers.   
We then test the predictions of our model on observed analyst forecast data. Consistent with 
our theoretical predictions, we document an approximately U-shaped relationship between the 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts from the consensus and their prior relative performance.  This result 
is robust to different empirical methodologies.  Consistent with prior empirical evidence, our results 
imply that analysts who face greater employment risk have greater incentives to herd.  Our 
theoretical and empirical analyses therefore highlight the importance of both explicit incentives in 
the form of compensation structures and implicit incentives in the form of career concerns, on the 
dynamic forecasting behavior of analysts.  
As noted by Welch (2000) one drawback of many existing models of herding is that they are 
static and designed only to explain a steady state in which all analysts herd perfectly.  These models 
are unable to explain why analysts may deviate from the consensus some times and herd at other 
times.  We address this issue by theoretically and empirically examining the dynamic forecasting 
behavior of investment analysts in response to their prior performance relative to their peers.  
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Proof of Lemma 1 
We first note that  
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Proof of Proposition 2:  
The proof proceeds by explicitly constructing a differentiable function u  that satisfies the 
hypotheses of Proposition 1, that is, 
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As  ∞ → r , the value function  r u  clearly approaches the value function  ∞ u of the policy of choosing 
strategy 2 for  b p p > . It is easy to see that the functional form of  ∞ u  for  b p p > is  
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It now easily follows by continuity that there exists  b p p > *  such that (A8) holds and 
therefore (A9) holds. We now show that  * p  is the required “optimal switching point” where 
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defined by setting  * p r =  in (12). By the result of Proposition 3, we need to show that  
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* p u  is twice differentiable at  * p p = , we can show (after some tedious algebra 
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 that is the value the analyst 
obtains from choosing strategy 1 when he faces employment risk for all values of  p , that is, there is 
no finite threshold  b p  beyond which the analyst does not face employment risk. 
From the definition (12) of 
* p u , this easily implies that we must have 
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+ + + c , (A20) implies that the first term on the right hand side above is 
negative and the second term is also negative. This clearly implies (A19). Therefore, we have 
shown that the value function 
* p u  satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 3 and is therefore the 
optimal value function of the analyst. Hence, the policy of switching policies at  * p  is optimal. This 
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Setting  b p r =  in (12), the value function 
b p u  has the following functional form: 
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b p u  must be at least as great as the value function of choosing strategy 1 when the analyst 
faces employment risk for all values of  p , we must have  
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− − < 2 1 η η , then (A24) implies that the first term on the right hand side above is negative. Since 
+ < ≤ 1 1 η c , the second term is also negative. On the other hand, if 
− − > 2 1 η η , then the first term on the 
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b > < + , 0 ) ( 2 . Therefore, we have established (A25). Hence, the function 
b p u  satisfies  
the hypotheses of Proposition 3. Hence, the policy of always choosing strategy 1 is optimal. This 
completes the proof. 
  
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
This table shows various summary statistics for our sample of analysts’ forecasts.  The data consists of all quarterly 
forecasts of earnings per share between 1988 and 2000 contained in the IBES Detail History File.  The number of 
investment firms each quarter and number of analysts issuing forecasts each quarter are the average number of 
investment firms submitting forecasts to IBES each quarter and the number of unique analysts submitting forecasts 
respectively.  Experience is calculated for each analyst as the difference between the year of the forecast and the 
analyst’s first year submitting forecasts to the IBES database.  Analyst boldness and analyst accuracy are calculated 
using the ranking procedure of Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000). 
 
   Mean  Median  Std. Deviation  Min   Max 
Number of investment firms each quarter  366.37   386.00   90.99   194.00   510.00  
Number of analysts issuing forecasts each quarter  1,763.67   1,607.00   626.50   768.00   2,861.00  
Number of stocks covered per quarter  7.32   6.00   6.28   1.00   94.00  
Number of analysts following a stock  5.56   4.00   4.35   2.00   38.00  
Experience  4.46   3.00   3.96   0.00   20.00  
Average analyst boldness  50.38   50.00   18.32   0.00   100.00  
Average analyst accuracy  50.46   50.00   19.68   0.00   100.00  
                 
  
Table 2.  Transition Matrix 
This table shows a transition matrix relating past average boldness to future boldness.   The table is constructed as 
follows.  For each quarter in our sample period, we rank analysts into deciles based on their average boldness score over 
the previous four quarters.  We perform a similar ranking of the boldness scores for the current score.  The p-value from 
a χ
2 test for equal proportions is reported for each past boldness decile.  
 
 
   Boldness    






Least Bold  15.93% 11.09%  8.43% 7.62% 7.44% 10.46% 6.94% 7.58% 9.50%  15.02% 0.001 
2  10.79% 11.90% 11.90% 10.80% 10.07% 9.87%  9.49% 8.85%  8.34%  8.00% 0.001 
3  8.72% 11.53%  12.27%  11.59% 11.05% 9.74% 10.21% 9.45%  8.47%  6.97% 0.001 
4  8.02% 10.79% 11.51% 12.18% 10.98% 10.12% 11.05% 10.06%  8.61%  6.68% 0.001 
5  7.21% 9.96% 12.04% 11.76% 11.56% 9.77%  11.49% 10.29%  9.42%  6.51% 0.001 
6  8.99% 9.45% 9.78% 10.31% 10.45% 11.46% 10.62%  10.91% 9.13%  8.89% 0.001 
7  7.38% 9.48% 9.59% 10.91% 10.99% 9.97% 11.05%  11.76%  10.86%  8.01% 0.001 
8  7.95% 8.80% 9.62% 10.17% 9.48% 10.17% 10.96%  11.26%  12.07%  9.52% 0.001 











































Most Bold  14.97% 8.26% 7.07% 6.55% 7.20% 10.54% 7.39% 8.67%  11.33%  18.02% 0.001 
  
Table 3.   Past performance and future boldness 
This table examines the relation between past performance and future boldness.  Analysts are ranked each quarter on the 
basis of their average accuracy over the previous four, eight, and twelve quarters.  The analysts are then sorted into 
deciles, with Decile 1 containing the worst performing analysts and Decile 10 containing the best performing analyst.  
We then compute mean future boldness for each decile.  The p-value reported for each decile tests whether the mean 
boldness is statistically different from the average boldness of quartiles five and six. 
 
 
Panel A:  Performance rankings based on one year of past data    
        
Past Performance quartile  Past Performance  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 26.38  51.72  51  0.00 
2 40.31  51.27  51  0.00 
3 44.46  50.53  51  0.00 
4 47.25  50.19  51  0.01 
5 49.54  49.89  51  0.02 
6 51.61  49.28  51  0.02 
7 54.00  49.20  51  0.07 
8 56.97  49.60  51  0.96 
9 61.54  49.89  51  0.26 
Best 76.31  50.55  51  0.00 
        
Panel B:  Performance rankings based on two years of past data     
        
Past Performance quartile  Past Performance  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 28.54  51.80  51  0.00 
2 41.89  51.49  51  0.00 
3 45.48  50.60  51  0.00 
4 47.88  50.18  51  0.03 
5 49.81  50.13  51  0.01 
6 51.59  49.28  51  0.01 
7 53.62  49.39  51  0.19 
8 56.13  49.02  51  0.01 
9 60.12  49.74  51  0.90 
Best 74.24  50.96  51  0.00 
        
Panel C:  Performance rankings based on three years of past data    
        
Past Performance quartile  Past Performance  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 29.24  51.75  51  0.00 
2 42.42  51.30  51  0.00 
3 45.89  50.76  51  0.00 
4 48.13  50.48  51  0.00 
5 49.93  49.99  51  0.03 
6 51.63  49.41  51  0.03 
7 53.53  49.11  51  0.01 
8 55.88  49.32  51  0.17 
9 59.72  49.68  51  0.84 
Best 73.59  50.90  51  0.00 
  
Table 4.  Past Performance and future boldness controlling for past boldness 
This table examines the relation between past performance and future boldness, controlling for past boldness.  Past 
boldness is calculated as the average boldness score for each analyst over the previous four quarters.  The p-value 
reported for each decile tests whether the mean boldness is statistically different from the average boldness of quartiles 
five and six. 
 
Panel A:  Performance rankings based on one year of past data. 
Past Performance quartile  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 51.06  51  0.00 
2 50.71  51  0.00 
3 50.38  51  0.08 
4 50.19  51  0.29 
5 50.12  51  0.13 
6 49.68  51  0.13 
7 49.70  51  0.44 
8 49.94  51  0.87 
9 50.08  51  0.48 
Best 50.61  51  0.00 
      
Panel B:  Performance rankings based on two years of past data   
      
Past Performance quartile  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 51.09  51  0.00 
2 50.74  51  0.00 
3 50.24  51  0.18 
4 50.62  51  0.00 
5 49.94  51  0.65 
6 49.81  51  0.65 
7 50.06  51  0.57 
8 49.60  51  0.19 
9 49.78  51  0.75 
Best 50.76  51  0.00 
      
Panel C:  Performance rankings based on three years of past data   
      
Past Performance quartile  Boldness  # of observations  P-value 
Worst 51.09  51  0.00 
2 50.57  51  0.03 
3 50.45  51  0.02 
4 50.44  51  0.06 
5 50.26  51  0.10 
6 49.73  51  0.10 
7 49.90  51  0.70 
8 49.73  51  0.20 
9 49.85  51  0.59 
Best 50.65  51  0.02  
Table 5.  Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions.  The dependent variable in each regression is the boldness 
score.  Worst past performance decile is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the analyst’s average 
forecasting performance over the previous four quarters was in the bottom 10% and zero otherwise.  Best past 
performance decile is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the analyst’s average forecasting performance 
over the previous four quarters was in the top 10% and zero otherwise.  High experience is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one if the analysts has four or more years of experience and zero otherwise.  Number of firms covered 
is the number of firms covered by the analyst in the quarter.  Past boldness is the average boldness score of the analyst 
over the previous four quarters.  We include controls for industry effects.  We use the IBES SIG code to define the 
industries.  The average R
2 from the 51 quarterly regressions are reported.  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
      Boldness 
      (1)   (2)    (3) 
Intercept  50.64  46.94  46.87 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
          
Worst past performance decile  1.88  1.14  0.56 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.15) 
          
Best past performance decile  0.80  0.50  0.67 
   (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
          
high experience     0.06  -0.04 
      (0.71)  (0.80) 
          
past boldness     0.08  0.08 
      (0.00)  (0.00) 
          
number of firms covered     -0.05  -0.05 
      (0.00)  (0.00) 
          
Worst past performance decile*high exp      1.80 
       (0.01) 
          
Best past performance decile*high exp      -0.94 
       (0.22) 
          
Industry Effects  YES  YES  YES 
          
N  51  51  51 
          
Average R
2  0.073   0.079    0.081 
 